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RIGHTS OF FARMERS IN
FAILED GRAIN ELEVATORS
— by Roger A. McEowen* and Neil E. Harl**
During the farm debt crisis of the 1980s,1 grain elevator failures became a common
occurrence in many rural communities.  In recent years, elevator failures have occurred
as a result of abuses with respect to hedge-to-arrive contracts and improper or
unauthorized activity in futures markets.  Presently, the severe decline in the farm
economy has placed additional stress on elevators.  With the recent news of the failure of
the largest agricultural cooperative in the state of Kansas2 the issue of grain elevator
failures has received renewed attention along with its impact on grain depositors and on
the agricultural community.
Upon the failure of a grain elevator the significant questions for those affected by the
failure are their legal status and the probable amount and timing of any recovery.
Grain in Storage
Farmer position.  A farmer who has grain in storage with an elevator that files
bankruptcy is not a creditor of the elevator.  Instead, grain in storage remains the property
of the farmer who stored the grain, with ownership of the grain evidenced by warehouse
receipts and scale tickets.  The storing of the grain establishes a bailee-bailor
relationship.3  The relationship is unaffected by the fact that the bailee will return to the
bailor grain of like quality rather than the identical grain.4  While t is easier to prove
ownership with a warehouse receipt, both warehouse receipts and scale tickets are prima
facie evidence of ownership of the stored grain.
Commingled grain stored in an elevator is deemed to be owned in common by persons
storing the grain.5  As a result, absent a grain shortage, a depositor can obtain his or her
grain in accordance with their warehouse receipt and/or scale ticket.  A trustee in
bankruptcy is not entitled to retain farmer-stored grain in the bankrupt’s estate so long as
there is no shortage, because the trustee can only succeed to the rights that the bankrupt
possessed, and stored grain is not property of the elevator.  Under 11 U.S.C. § 725, the
trustee, after notice and hearing, is allowed to dispose of property in which an entity,
other than the bankruptcy estate, has an interest.6  Clearly, once a farmer proves
ownership and pays all storage and other costs, the farmer is entitled to their grain.
However, there is typically less grain in an elevator at the time of the bankruptcy filing
than there are claims against the grain by holders of negotiated receipts and scale tickets.
As a result, the holders of negotiated receipts and scale tickets share pro rata in the
remaining grain.  In the normal course of events, the bankruptcy trustee sells the grain
remaining in storage and makes a pro rata distribution of the money received from the
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sale of the grain along with any bond money provided by the
elevator’s bonding company.  A farmer who has not been fully
compensated is a general, unsecured creditor of the elevator to the
extent of any loss.
Bankruptcy priority.  In 1984, the Congress authorized a
limited priority for grain producers.7  Under the provision,
unsecured claims of grain producers, up to $4,300 per producer
for grain or the proceeds of grain against a debtor owning or
operating a grain storage facility (and unsecured claims of
fishermen, up to $4,300 per fisherman, against a debtor operating
a fish produce or processing facility), are given a priority for
purposes of distributions in bankruptcy of the grain storage
facility.8  The priority is fifth in line after administration expenses
in bankruptcy;9  unsecured claims arising after an involuntary
petition is filed and before an order for relief is granted or a
trustee is appointed;10 unsecured claims for wages, salaries and
commissions up to $4,300 per creditor earned within the earlier of
90 days before the filing of the petition or cessation of the
debtor’s business;11 and unsecured claims for contributions to
employee benefit plans up to $4,300 per employee less any
amount paid under the preceding priority.12  The grain producer
priority is ahead of the sixth priority claim (up to $1,950 per claim
of unsecured amounts for money deposited with the debtor for
purchase, lease or rental of property or services that were not
delivered or provided);13 the seventh priority claim for debts to a
spouse, former spouse or child of the debtor and for alimony,
maintenance or support payments to a spouse or child under a
separation agreement or divorce decree, except to the extent the
debt was assigned to a third party;14 and the eighth priority claim
for unsecured claims for taxes.15
For purposes of the fifth priority position of claims by grain
producers, “grain” is defined broadly to include wheat, corn, flax
seed, grain sorghum, barley, oats, rye, soybeans, other dry edible
beans, and rice.16  “Grain storage facility” is defined as a site or
physical structure used to store grain for producers or to store
grain acquired from producers for resale.17  “Producer” means an
entity which engages in the growing of grain.18
Unfortunately, the $4,300 priority is of only limited benefit to
most affected producers, and is not available if the grain producer
has transferred title to the elevator.19  However, the Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Kansas has held that the priority
provision also accords priority status above even s cured
creditors as to grain held by the elevator which is owned by the
producers.20  The result is that the elevator’s financier is not
entitled to participate in the pro rata distribution of the elevator’s
remaining grain along with the producers that had grain on
storage at the time the elevator filed bankruptcy.21  Although the
court did not cite any specific statutory language for the holding,
the court cited the Senate Report to S.R. 445:
“The bill would require the court to distribute grain assets or
the proceeds of such assets first to producers who have
merely stored their grain in such a facility upon a contract of
bailment.”22
Technically, the only priority specifically granted by the
bankruptcy act amendments of 1984 is a fifth priority for
unsecured claims of grain producers to the extent of $4,300.23
Thus, it appears that the case represents an extension of the
statute.  The case was affirmed on appeal,24 but the court did not
discuss the priority of grain depositors as against an elevator’s
secured creditors under bankruptcy law.  The court relied instead
on a state statute25 that gives grain depositors priority over a
warehous  owner and the owner’s creditors in the grain stored in
th  elevator.
Expedited procedure.  The bankruptcy code authorizes an
expedited procedure for determining ownership of the available
grain.  A bankruptcy court may, notwithstanding any of the
bankruptcy code provisions concerning adequate protection, use
of estate property, assumption of contracts and leases or
aba donments of bankruptcy estate property, expedite the
procedures for determining interests in and disposition of grain
and grain proceeds held by a debtor in a grain storage facility by
sh r ening otherwise applicable time periods so that the entire
procedure takes no more than 120 days.26 A bankruptcy court
must, upon the request of a grain producer who is a creditor of a
bankruptcy storage facility, expedite the determination of the
i rests in the disposition of the grain held by the facility.27
Several features of the expedited procedure should be noted:
• The expedited procedure can be requested by the trustee or by
any person claiming an interest in the grain.28
• The extent to which a court shortens the time period is
depende t upon a number of factors including the market for the
grain, the conditions under which the grain is stored, the expense
of storage and the need of an interested party for a prompt
determination.29
• The court may extend the period for final disposition of grain
or grain proceeds beyond 120 days if justice so requires because
of the complexity of the case and claimants entitled to the grain
will not be materially injured by the additional delay.30
• Unl ss an order establishing an expected procedure is stayed
depending an appeal, reversal or modification of the order on
appeal does not affect the validity of any disposition of the grain
occurring before the reversal or modification and any proceedings
in the case where the order is issued cannot be delayed.31
• The trust e can recover from the grain, or the proceeds from
the grain, the reasonable and necessary costs for preserving or
disposing of the grain or the proceeds of the grain.32
• If a debtor operating a grain storage facility has more than
10,000 bushels of a specific type of grain, which is usually the
case, the trustee must sell the grain and distribute the proceeds as
determined by the court.33
Grain Sold on Contract
Undel vered grain.  For grain that has been sold on contract to
an elevator that files bankruptcy after the time the contract was
entered into, but before the time specified for delivery of the
grain, the grain seller is entitled to refuse delivery if the buyer is
inso ven  unless payment can be made in cash.34 U der a separate
provision, an unsecured party may request adequate assurance
from the other party to the contract.35  Both the request for and the
granting of adequate assurance must be commercially
reasonable.36
Cash forward, deferred payment and deferred price contracts.
Except for the limited priority in bankruptcy, unsecured creditors
typically do not fare well in an elevator failure.  Grain producers
who have sold and delivered grain to the elevator before the
elevator failed under forward, deferred payment or deferred
pricing contracts are unsecured creditors in the event of elevator
failure and usually do not participate in state indemnity funds37 or
elevat r bonding protection.38
Once grain has been delivered under a contract to an elevator,
title p sse  to the elevator, and the seller becomes a general
cr itor with no right to reclaim the delivered grain.  However,
under the bankruptcy rules, a limited possibility for reclaiming
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delivered grain may be present.39  U der the provision, a seller
may reclaim goods upon written demand within ten days after the
insolvent debtor receives the goods.40  If the ten-day period
expires after commencement of the case, the seller can reclaim the
goods within 20 days after the debtor receives the goods.41  While
the right of reclamation is generally subject to the automatic
stay,42 a demand for redelivery is specifically made not subject to
the automatic stay.43
Equity Holders
The equity holders of a bankrupt grain facility that is an
agricultural cooperative have limited liability protection much
like a shareholders in a corporation.
Potential Legislative Remedy
Under the Packers and Stockyards Act44 provision is made for
failure to make prompt and full payment for livestock.  Under the
provision, before the close of the next business day following the
purchase of the livestock, the packer, market agency or dealer
must deliver a check or wire funds to the seller.  This provision
was added in 1976 and, when the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 was
amended in 1987, the provision was exempted from the
Bankruptcy Act so even though a packer goes into bankruptcy,
the proceeds of livestock sales are held in trust out of bankruptcy
away from the creditors to assure payment to the seller of the
livestock.  Written notice must be given to the purchaser and the
USDA if payment is not made or an instrument of payment is
dishonored.  Unpaid cash sellers of livestock have priority over
holders of perfected security interests of the purchaser as to the
purchaser’s assets.45  Nothing but “an express agreement in
writing” can operate as a waiver of the seller’s right to next-day
cash payment for livestock.  Proof of delay or a course of dealing
is not sufficient to constitute a waiver.  However, with a written
agreement to defer the payment or pricing of livestock, there is a
danger of waiving the right to prompt, next-day payment and
becoming no more than an unsecured creditor.
Arguably, a similar provision to the PSA provision for unpaid
sellers of livestock should be created for unpaid sellers of grain.
Other Remedies
Farmers adversely affected by an elevator failure whose claims
are not made whole may consider other forms of legal relief.
While directors are generally not personally liable for individual
debts of the organization, they are subject to fiduciary duties of
obedience, loyalty and care.  Co-op directors have the same
fiduciary duties that corporate directors have.46  Directors can
become personally liable to a creditor either by statute or by any
conduct that creates privity of contract or results in tortious injury
to the creditor.47  A breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty may be
present, for example, when a director fails to disclose information
concerning the co-op in an open and fair manner to the co-op’s
stockholders and patrons, or acts on inside information for
personal benefit that is detrimental to stockholders and/or patrons.
Liability exposure upon failure of an elevator may also lie with
employees of state and federal agencies responsible for
monitoring the operation of licensed elevators.  Such lawsuits,
however, frequently fight an uphill battle against federal and state
tort claims acts.48
If corn has been contaminated, for example by StarlinkTM corn,49
the grain may not be salable for food use and may no longer be
eligible for treatment as a fungible product as No. 2 yellow corn.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSE . The debtors filed for
Chapter 12 in March 1996 and incurred casino gambling debts in
May 1999 while the case was still pending. The case was
converted to Chapter 7 in June 1999 and a discharge was granted
in October 1999. The casino sought administrative expense
priority for the gambling debts. The court held that the gambling
debt was not an administrative expense and the debt was
discharged because the pre-conversion debt was deemed a pre-
petition dischargeable debt. In re Hill, 251 B.R. 816 (Bankr.
N.D. Miss. 2000).
DEATH OF DEBTOR . The debtor filed for Chapter 7 in April
2000 but died in June 2000 before the meeting of creditors. The
attorney for the debtor moved to have the debtor’s daughter
appear on the debtor’s behalf because the daughter held a power
of attorney and was familiar with the debtor’s estate. The court
held that the chapter 7 case could continue but that the debtor’s
probate estate representative was the proper person to attend the
creditor’s meeting and to continue the bankruptcy case. In re
Lucio, 251 B.R. 705 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2000).
EXEMPTIONS
MOTOR VEHICLE. The debtor claimed an exemption, under
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 513.430, subd. 1(5) for an all-terrain vehicle
(ATV). The trustee argued that the ATV was not a motor vehicle
entitled to the exemption because the ATV could not be operated
on a highway. The court allowed the exemption and held that the
statute did not include any limitation but applied simply to “any
motor vehicle” which included ATVs. In re Moore, 251 B.R. 380
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2000).
Chapter 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
ATTORNEY FEES. A secured creditor had incurred attorney
fees after confirmation of the debtor’s plan. The fees were for
preparation of documents to be recorded, contacts with law
enforcement officials about the debtor’s unauthorized sale of
grain, preparation of a confirmation order and documents relating
to the debtor’s default on plan payments. Nebraska followed the
American Rule which limits awards of attorney fees to successful
litigants unless the fees are expressly provided by statute. The
creditor argued that Section 506 allowed recovery of attorney fees
for oversecured claims. The court held that Section 506 did not
supersede the state rule to allow post-confirmation attorney fees.
In re Lichty, 251 B.R. 76 (Bankr. D. Neb. 2000).
FEDERAL TAX     -ALM § 13.03[7].*
AVOIDABLE LIENS . A Chapter 13 debtor sought to avoid
perfected tax liens by arguing that the debtor, acting as trustee,
had the power, under Section 545, to avoid liens. Section 545(2)
makes th  trustee a hypothetical bona fide purchaser of estate
property. The debtor argued that, under I.R.C. § 6323, the trustee
was a bona fide purchaser of the estate property entitled to a
higher priority than the tax liens. The court rejected this
argument, although noting that a minority of courts have agreed
with the debtor’s arguments, and held that the trustee’s status as a
hy othetical bona fide purchaser was not sufficient to be a bona
fi e purc aser under I.R.C. § 6323. In re Stangel, 219 F.3d 498
(5th Cir. 2000), aff’g unrep. D. Ct. dec. aff’g, 222 B.R. 289
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1998).
DISCHARGE . The debtor originally filed a Chapter 13 case on
February 25, 1993, but obtained a dismissal of the case on June 1,
1995. The pr sent Chapter 7 case was filed on August 27, 1997
and the debtor sought a ruling that 1991 and 1992 taxes were
dischargeable as due more than three years before the chapter 7
filing. The Bankruptcy Court held that, under the plain language
of the statute, Section 507(a)(8)(A)(i), the previous bankruptcy
case did not toll the three year period. The Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel rev rsed, holding that the clear Congressional intent was
that the IRS was to have a full three years to collect a tax and that
the Section 507 three year limitation was tolled during the
revi us bankruptcy case. The Court of Appeals reinstated the
Bankruptcy Court decision, holding that Section 507(a)(8)(A)(i)
was unambiguous in not providing for a tolling of the three year
period. Although the court acknowledged that the Bankruptcy
C urt had equitable powers to toll the period, there were no
circumstances, such as debtor misconduct, in this case that
justified using those equitable powers.  In re Palmer, 219 F.3d
580 (6th Cir. 2000), rev’g, 228 B.R. 880 (Bankr. 6th Cir. 1999).
The d y before the debtor filed for Chapter 7, the IRS attempted
to ex cu e a levy under a court Order for Entry by inventorying
the d btor’s assets at the debtor’s residence. The debtor refused
